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Judicial fragmentation on indigenous property rights: causes, 
consequences and solutions 
This paper engages in the analysis of the phenomenon of judicial fragmentation as 
affecting the case-law of regional human rights bodies on indigenous property 
rights.  It aims at identifying the features of such divergent understanding of 
indigenous rights between the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, investigating the causes behind it. Finally, after 
having highlighted some of the adverse consequences of judicial fragmentation, 
the article presents some possible solutions for ensuring convergence and a higher 
standard of protection for indigenous rights. 
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Introduction 
Judicial fragmentation is defined as the phenomenon arising when two courts 
seized of the same (or similar) matter issue contrasting or conflicting judgments.1  Said 
otherwise, judicial fragmentation is the consequence of different judicial interpretations 
of similar provisions by two or more judicial bodies. As highlighted by some scholars,2 
this is not a predominant phenomenon within International Human Rights Law but it does 
affect specific rights, especially if looking at the case-law of regional human rights 
bodies. The regional jurisprudence of the European, Inter-American and African systems 
on indigenous property rights offers an emblematic example of such fragmentation.  
The complex matter of the communal and ancestral right to property for 
indigenous people has been widely discussed by scholars and practitioners3 and it is still 
 
1 Cfr. Philippa Webb, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation (Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
2 Marjan Ajevski, Fragmentation in International Human Rights Law: Beyond Conflict of Laws 
(Routledge, 2015) 
3 Cfr. Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous rights and United Nations standards: self-determination, 
culture and land (CUP, 2007);  Ann Curthoys, Ann Genovese and Alexander Reilly, Rights 
and Redemption: History, Law and Indigenous People, (UNSW Press, 2008); Stan Stevens, 
Indigenous Peoples, National Parks and Protected Areas: a New Paradigm Linking 
in the process of being adequately protected by international rules. Indeed, the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP)4 was adopted only in 2007 
and the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal people’s rights5 has been 
ratified so far by merely 22 countries.  Cultural and historical variables play a key role in 
recognizing the right to communal property for indigenous people. Indeed, while 
indigenous communities and minority groups are a reality everywhere, the fact that these 
groups have had a fundamental role in the history of Latin America and Africa, compared 
to the history of Europe, significantly affected the protection of their rights especially in 
the judicial interpretation of regional human rights bodies.  
The right to property is similarly articulated in regional human rights instruments; 
namely Article 14 of the African Charter, Article 21 of the American Convention and 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. Whilst these 
instruments slightly differ in the text, they all establish the principle that everyone should 
have the right to use and enjoy his property within the limits that the State may impose 
on certain legitimate grounds.6   
 
Conservation, Culture and Rights, (University of Arizona Press, 2014); Roger Plant, Land 
rights and minorities (London Minority Group, 1994) and Jo M. Pasqualucci ‘International 
indigenous Land Rights: a critique of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 27 (2010)  51. 
4 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 
A/RES/61/295, adopted on 2nd October 2007, hereinafter UNDRIP. 
5 International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27th 
June 1989, hereinafter ILO Convention 169. 
6 Article 14 of the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights states: “The right to property 
shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the 
general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.” 
 Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights states: “1.Everyone has the right to the 
use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the 
interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just 
compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to 
the forms established by law. 3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall 
be prohibited by law.”  
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights states: “1. Every 
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall 
However, the application of such provisions in the specific case of land claims by 
indigenous groups did reveal a noteworthy difference in the approach towards the right 
to collective property of ancestral lands as well as a different understanding of the 
meaning of property for indigenous people.  
This analysis will consider the case-law on indigenous land rights of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
and the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights (ACommHPR), revealing 
how the European Court is still overly attached to a private conception of the property 
and is reluctant to adapt its jurisprudence to the other regional systems.  
The second part will then attempt to identify some of the possible causes and 
consequences of judicial fragmentation, ranging from legal to political and sociological 
concerns. 
In conclusion, after a further discussion of the existing international framework 
on indigenous rights, it will be argued that the transformation of the UNDRIP into a 
proper binding treaty and the increasing lobbying and pressure from NGOs and civil 
society on the European Court could be two possible solutions for significantly reducing 
judicial fragmentation.  
 
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 2. The preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it 
deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
Indigenous property rights before regional human rights courts 
The European Court of Human Rights 
The right to property under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
is regulated by Article 1 of the First Protocol which states: 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, 
in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary 
to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’7 
The provision seems quite generic, leaving significant power for states to interfere with 
private property. Moreover, the lack of any express reference to a right to compensation, 
with the exception of the very general mention to principles of international law, is the 
consequence of a highly debated drafting process that ended up with a cautious 
formulation. 
Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR, as well as the rest of the European Convention, did 
not make any reference to indigenous people or community, leaving a very wide margin 
of interpretation to the ECtHR in adjudicating indigenous property claims.  
The European Court have made significant progresses from the position of its 
predecessor, the European Commission, that stated in 1983, in G. and E. v Norway, that 
the ‘Convention does not guarantee specific rights to minorities’.8 However, the two 
 
7 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, Article 1 Protocol 1. 
8 G. and E. v Norway, Application no 9278/81, 9415/81 (ECommHR, 1983), 30. 
recent cases, Hingitaq 53 and Others v Denmark9 and Handölsdalen Sami Village and 
Others v Sweden10 show that the protection granted to indigenous people claiming their 
right to property on the ancestral lands in Europe is still insufficient compared to the 
protection ensured in Africa or America, thus producing a situation of judicial 
fragmentation.11  
The Hingitaq 53 case concerned the claims of the Thule Tribe (a group of Inghuit) 
who claimed that the dispossession of their aboriginal lands by Denmark violated the 
right to a peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR. In 1951, 
Denmark decided to grant access to the United States to establish an air base in the Thule 
District and in 1953 allowed the US expanding the base across the entire District, thus 
forcing the Inughuit to leave their homes and settle in different areas where they could 
not perform any of their traditional activities. The European Court recognized that the 
Thule Tribe had an existing possession prior to the establishment of the air base but it 
concluded that the expropriation was not an arbitrary measure since it was meant to satisfy 
a public interest that, at the time, was ‘legal and valid’.12 Moreover, the Court 
acknowledged that the circumstances of the Cold War had justified the decision of 
Denmark and assessed that the applicants had received proper compensation for all the 
damages and losses, thus striking a fair balance between the interests at stake.13 In light 
of the above, the ECtHR rejected the application as being manifestly ill-founded. 
Furthermore, while the ECtHR did recognize, in theory, the specific communal rights of 
 
9 Hingitaq 53 and Others v Denmark, Application no 18584/04 (ECtHR, 12 January 2006). 
10 Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden, Application no 39013/04 (ECtHR, 30 March 
2010). 
11 Cfr. Timo Koivurova, ‘Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Regarding 
Indigenous Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects’, International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights 18 (2011): 1–37. 
12 Hingitaq 53 and Others v Denmark, The Fact, A. 
13 ibid, The Law, A. 
indigenous communities, it ended up not to apply them in the present case on the basis of 
the status of the Thule tribe. The Court argued that the latter did not retain ‘some or all of 
its own social, economic, cultural and political institutions’ needed for qualifying as a 
distinct community from the overall indigenous community inhabiting Greenland under 
Article 1(1)(b) of the ILO Convention 169, thus concluding that the ECtHR could not 
take a position in relation to the claim 1 and 2 of the case.14 
The only other relevant case of the European Court on the matter is Handölsdalen 
Sami Village and Others v Sweden. It concerned domestic proceedings about a disputed 
right of the Sami to use their ancestral land for winter grazing of their reindeers. Many 
landowners brought proceedings against Sami villages, including the applicants, seeking 
a judgment forbidding them from using the land without a proper contract with the 
respective owners. The issue was brought in front of national courts that found against 
the applicants, imposing significant fines on the Sami communities. The European Court, 
whilst recognizing that possessions for the application of Article 1 First Protocol include 
tangible as well as intangible goods15, assessed that the Sami’s claim for winter grazing 
rights in private property should not be regarded as an asset but rather a possession. The 
ECtHR required the Sami to prove such existing possession over the claimed land since 
a possession must be existing in order to receive legal protection.16 However, the Court 
held that the Sami were not able to provide such proof and, in light of this, it rejected the 
 
14 The complainant brought four claims as follows: 1) that they had the right to live in and use 
their native settlement in Ummannaq/Dundas in the Thule District; 2) that they had the right 
to move, stay and hunt in the entire Thule District; 3) that the Thule Tribe was entitled to 
compensation in the amount of DKK 25.000.000 and 4) that each individual was entitled to 
compensation in the amount of DKK 250.000. 
15 See, e.g., Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, Application no 8588/79 and 8589/79 (ECtHR, 
1982)[Admissibility], The Law, 1 b; Smith Kline and French Laboratories v. the Netherlands 
Application no. 12633/87 (ECtHR, 1990) The Law and Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis 
Andreadis v. Greece (Merits), Application no 13427/87, (ECtHR, 1994), 61-62. 
16 Marckx v Belgium Application no 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979), 50 and X v Federal Republic 
of Germany, Application no 8410/78 (ECtHR, 1979), 2. 
claims as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the ECtHR.17 The 
only contrasting voice was that of Judge Ziemele who, in her dissenting opinion, pointed 
out that the reasoning of the ECtHR did not take into consideration the specific features 
and rights of indigenous people.18 Recalling the development in the international 
framework on indigenous rights, namely the ILO Convention NO. 169 and the UNDRIP 
as approved by the General Assembly, Judge Ziemele observed that the burden of proof 
imposed on the Sami villages was too high and not adequate for the nature of their claim, 
thus discriminating the Sami villages compared to an individual litigant in Sweden.19 The 
dissenting opinion concluded that the ECtHR should have recognized ‘the right of 
indigenous peoples to own the land which such groups have traditionally used and to 
engage in traditional economic activities’20 and the legal technicalities that prevent this 
amount to a violation of the right to fair trial and access to justice.21 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the regional court that developed most of 
its jurisprudence on indigenous property rights. Article 21 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR) states:  
‘Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may 
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. No one shall be 
deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for 
reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the 
 
17 Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden [Admissibility], 56. 
18 ibid, dissenting opinion Judge Ziemele, 5. 
19 Ibid 2-7. 
20 Ibid 2. 
21 Ibid 8-10.  
forms established by law. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by 
man shall be prohibited by law.’22 
  Ruling on a significant number of cases on the matter, the IACtHR had the chance 
to discuss widely the extent of the right to property of indigenous people, going well 
beyond the letter of the provision contained in the American Convention. 
Of particular relevance for the current analysis are five cases decided by the Inter-
American Court: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua23, Yake Axa 
Indigenous Community v Paraguay24, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v 
Paraguay25, Saramaka v Suriname26 and Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v 
Ecuador27. 
The Awas Tigni case, in 2001, was a seminal case for the Inter-American human 
rights system and for the rights of indigenous people since the Court recognized, for the 
first time, that indigenous people do have a collective right to property on their ancestral 
land even if not officially recognized by the state. The facts were similar to the Hingitaq 
53 case. They concerned the complaints filed by the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community against the Government of Nicaragua for having forced them to leave their 
ancestral lands after granting logging concessions to private owners. However, in contrast 
to the ECtHR, the IACtHR decided to clearly support the indigenous claims by stating 
that ‘indigenous people, by the fact of their very existence, have the right to live freely in 
their own territory; the close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized 
and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their 
 
22  Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of 
San Jose", Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, Article 21. 
23 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (IACtHR, 31 August 2001). 
24 Yake Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (IACtHR, 17 June 2005). 
25 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (IACtHR, 29 March 2006). 
26 Saramaka People v Suriname (IACtHR, 28 November 2007). 
27 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador (IACtHR, 27 June 2012). 
integrity, and their economic survival.’28  The Court also stressed that the protection of 
communal lands was afforded ‘through an evolutionary interpretation of international 
instruments […] which precludes a restrictive interpretation of the rights’29 and held that 
‘possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to 
property of the land to obtain official recognition’ of ownership.30 Furthermore, the 
IACtHR clarified that the right to property as contained in international human rights 
treaties has an autonomous meaning and ‘cannot be made equivalent to the meaning given 
[…] in domestic law’.31 This is significantly different from the understanding of property 
within the case-law of the European Court that relies heavily on the decision of domestic 
courts for the determination of the meaning of possession.32 However, the Court kept a 
veil of uncertainty by citing Article 29 ACHR which restrict ‘the enjoyment or exercise 
of any right or freedom recognise by virtue of the laws of any State or by virtue of another 
convention to which one of the said states is a party’.33 In light of the domestic legislation 
of Nicaragua, recognizing communal property, the Court concluded that it was obliged to 
take the communal property dimension into account when interpreting Article 21.34 
Luckily, this gap was soon filled in Moiwana Village v Suriname, where the IACtHR held 
that Article 21 unconditionally entails the right to communal property, regardless of 
national legislation.35 
 
28 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua , 149. 
29 ibid, 148. 
30 ibid, 151. 
31 ibid, 146. 
32 Giovanna Gismondi, ‘Denial of Justice: The Latest Indigenous land Disputes Before the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Need for an Expansive Interpretation of Protocol 1’  
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 18 (2015), 42. 
33 American Convention on Human Rights, Article 29. 
34 Thomas M. Antkowiak, ‘Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-
American Court’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 13, no. 2 (2014): 
143–144. 
35 Moiwana Cmty v. Suriname (Moiwana Village) (IACtHR, 15 June 2005), 86 (5). 
Yake Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay is another significant judgment for 
the development and strengthening of indigenous land rights. Here the Court dealt with a 
dispute between private landowners and the Yakye Axa indigenous Community, in a way 
similar to Handölsdalen. In supporting the position of the applicant, the IACtHR warned 
its member states to recognize the fact that indigenous population have specific features 
that differ from the general population. Moreover, the Court connected the right to access 
to traditional lands with the surrounding habitat, holding that ‘states must take into 
account that indigenous territorial rights encompass a broader and different concept that 
relates to the collective right to survival as an organized people, with control over their 
habitat as a necessary condition for reproduction of their culture, for their development 
and to carry out their life aspirations’.36 States have a duty to ‘take positive, concrete 
measures geared toward fulfilment of the right to a decent life, especially in the case of 
persons who are vulnerable and at risk’ such as indigenous people; a failure to do so will 
constitute a violation of the right to vida digna and therefore Article 4. In addition, the 
Inter-American Court held that, when returning to ancestral lands is not possible, the 
selection of the alternative lands and/or the compensation are not left to the discretion of 
the state but should be the result of a ‘consensus with the indigenous people in accordance 
with their own mechanism of consultation, values, customs and customary law’.37 This is 
an alternative stance from the one of the ECtHR in Hingitaq 53, where nothing was said 
about the imposed choice of alternative lands and amount of compensation made by 
Denmark.38  
 
36 Yake Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, 146. 
37 ibid, 149-151. 
38 G Otis and A Laurent, ‘Indigenous Land Claims in Europe: The European Court of Human 
Rights and the Decolonization of Property’, Arctic Review on Law and Politics 4, no. 2 (2013): 
156–80, http://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/download/47/47; Birgitte Feiring, 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Lands, Territories and Resources, 2013. 
In Sawhoyamaxa, the Inter-American Court adopted a diametrically opposed position 
compared to the European Court’s position in Hingitaq 53. Here the IACtHR asserted 
that ‘communities who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost possession 
thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even though they lack legal title; […] and who 
have unwillingly lost possession of their lands, when those lands have been lawfully 
transferred to innocent third parties, are entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain other 
lands of equal extension and quality’.39 Moreover, while dealing with a claim arising out 
of a dispute between private parties and indigenous communities, the Court said that it 
must ‘assess in each case the legality, necessity, proportionality and fulfilment of a lawful 
purpose in a democratic society to impose restriction on the right to property, on the one 
hand, or the right to traditional lands, on the other’. As some scholars pointed out,40 in 
Handölsdalen, the ECtHR should have consider also the right of the Sami people to their 
cultural integrity in striking a fair balance with the right to property of the landowners.  
Saramaka v Suriname reinforced all the previous concepts and reaffirmed the 
strong position of the Inter-American Court in recognizing full ancestral land rights to 
indigenous communities. Here the Court deeply linked the right to property with the right 
to use and enjoy natural resources in a way that, if endorsed by the European Court, would 
have produced a different outcome in the Handölsdalen case. Indeed, the IACtHR stated 
that the protection of the communal lands was ‘necessary to guarantee their [Saramaka 
people] survival’ and, more importantly, that ‘the right to the land itself would be 
“meaningless” without rights to the natural resources therein’.41 Therefore, the Inter-
American Court interpreted the right to property as protecting also those ‘resources 
 
39 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, 128. 
40 Otis and Laurent, ' Indigenous Land Claims in Europe', 157; Koivurova, ' Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights', 137. 
41 Saramaka People v Suriname,122. 
traditionally used and necessary for the very survival, development and continuation of 
such people’s way of life’, thus extending its definition of vida digna.42 Moreover, in the 
same case, which concerned the granting of logging and mining concessions to private 
companies in a traditional territory without prior consultation with the indigenous people, 
the IACtHR established that the State is required to implement some safeguards in order 
to protect the rights and interests of the affected indigenous populations.43 Compared to 
both Hingitaq 53 and Handölsdalen, it is evident how the ECtHR did not engage in any 
of this discussion and did not feel the need to set any safeguards for the protection of 
indigenous people’s rights when ruling against them. 
The most recent case on the matter is Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v 
Ecuador44, issued in 2012. In this case Ecuador did recognize the communal property of 
the Sarayaku but retained a number of rights, including the exploitation of subsurface 
natural resources.45 The ruling in favour of the applicants confirmed that Article 21 
protects communal property and held, for the first time, that it was the Sarayaku 
community as indigenous community, rather than just the sum of individuals, who 
suffered a collective violation.46 Moreover, the Court stressed the importance of the ‘right 
to consultations’ and effective participation of the indigenous community whose 
 
42 ibid. 
43 “First, the State must ensure the effective participation of the members of the Saramaka people, 
in conformity with their customs and traditions, regarding any development, investment, 
exploration or extraction plan (hereinafter “development or investment plan”) within 
Saramaka territory. Second, the State must guarantee that the Saramakas will receive a 
reasonable benefit from any such plan within their territory. Thirdly, the State must ensure that 
no concession will be issued within Saramaka territory unless and until independent and 
technically capable entities, with the State’s supervision, perform a prior environmental and 
social impact assessment. These safeguards are intended to preserve, protect and guarantee the 
special relationship that the members of the Saramaka community have with their territory, 
which in turn ensures their survival as a tribal people.” ibid,127-129. 
44 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, (IACtHR, 27 June 2012). 
45 Ibid 61-72. 
46 Ibid 341 (2). 
traditional lands are put at risk47, considering it not only provided by the American 
Convention but a ‘general principle of international law’.48 
The African Commission of Human and People’s Rights 
The African Commission of Human and People’s Rights followed the progressive 
line of interpretation of the Inter-American Court, thus diverging considerably from the 
position of the European Court. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
provides, in Article 14, that: ‘The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be 
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community 
and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.’49 The Endorois case 
concerned the displacement of the indigenous community Endorois from their ancestral 
lands following the decision of the Government of Kenya to convert the area in a national 
reserve for conservation purposes.50 Here the Commission took a clear stance in favour 
of the Endorois community. It openly recognized that the ‘the encroachment on Endorois 
land was not proportional to any public need and not in accordance with national and 
international law’,51 and ordered Kenya to return the lands to the community. By 
frequently referring to the case-law of the Inter-American Court, the African Commission 
recognized that the right to property should be guaranteed to the indigenous community 
even if the domestic legislation does not recognize collective rights. In 2012, the case was 
referred to the African Court of Human and People’s Rights, becoming the first case on 
 
47 Ibid E.2.a. 
48 Antkowiak, ‘Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric’, 157. 
49 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul 
Charter"), 27 June 1981, Article 14. 
50 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on 
behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, Communicatio no 276/03 (ACommHPR, 25 
November 2009), 3. 
51 ibid, 238 
indigenous rights to appear before the African Court.52 While the petition is still pending, 
the Court issued provisional measures after finding an extremely serious and urgent 
situation of human rights violations.53 
Case-law assessment 
In light of the above, it is possible to conclude that the protection of property rights 
for indigenous people is fragmented among regional human rights bodies.  
From the previous analysis it seems quite clear that the key difference between 
the regional courts’ approaches is that the European Court continues addressing 
indigenous land rights claim as any other private property rights case, without taking into 
serious consideration the features of the applicant.  
In Hingitaq 53, when rejecting the case and considering the compensation and the 
alternative land received as proportionate for the Inghuit community, the ECtHR seemed 
to ignore the need of the indigenous community as such and treating it as any group of 
people being forced to leave their home. In contrast, both the Inter-American Court and 
the African Commission focused on the specific nature of an indigenous community and 
reflected on the importance of the land as part of their own culture, history and life. Not 
surprisingly, the Inter-American Court often linked the protection of indigenous ancestral 
land to the concept of vida digna, stating that the use and enjoyment of their ancestral 
land is fundamental to live a life with dignity.54  
The same consideration can be made for the Handölsdalen case. Here, the ECtHR, 
when rejecting the case because the applicant was not able to demonstrate the existing 
 
52 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights v The Republic of Kenya, Application No. 
006/2012 (ACtHPR). 
53 Feiring, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Lands, Territories and Resources’, 34. 
54 Cfr. Xákmok Kásek v. Paraguay (IACtHR, 24 August 2010), 107. 
possession, did not consider the specificity of indigenous ancestral land rights. First, the 
Court did not recognize the right to collective property over an ancestral land in absence 
of a legal title. Second, it completely ignored the fact that for an indigenous community 
the use of the land for traditional activities is part of its own existence. In contrast, both 
the IACtHR and the ACommHPR reached the opposite conclusion when dealing with 
similar situations of a property right claim over a land that could not be legally justified 
and demonstrated. Indeed, they both concluded that the requirement of a legal title should 
be widely interpreted and that traditional activities connected to the land are fundamental 
for the survival of the indigenous community. 
Causes of judicial fragmentation 
The cause of the current situation of judicial fragmentation on indigenous property 
rights is certainly the different approach, on the one hand, of the progressive Inter-
American Court and African Commission and, on the other hand, of the conservative 
European Court. Still, the reasons behind the rigid and individualistic attitude of the 
European Court are not fully clear.  
Certainly, the letter of the articles protecting the right to property can not be 
invoked as the sole cause of such divergent interpretation. Indeed, as previously recalled, 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR is actually the most advanced and 
comprehensive right to property, especially in comparison to the African and American 
instruments for its explicit reference to the enjoyment of the property and to any “natural 
or legal person” as right holder. However, the different regional framework on minority 
and indigenous rights should be taken into consideration. The little attention within the 
European system towards indigenous rights is demonstrated by the lack of any explicit 
reference to indigenous people in the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities. While some indigenous groups can fit within the very broad 
definition of national minority, the absence of a clear mention to the rights of indigenous 
people in a specific instrument is an evident signal of the lack of interest towards this 
issue within the European system. Nonetheless, one should not ignore that even within 
the Inter-American and African system there is no specific reference to or convention on 
indigenous rights. Therefore, the argument of the different legal framework can only 
partially explain the phenomenon of fragmentation.    
The margin of appreciation, often invoked in cases of fragmentation as a possible 
explanation, here finds little application. The European Court did grant a wide margin of 
appreciation to the states in defining the criteria for attributing the property and 
negotiating the reparations and the alternative lands, but it did not justify its outcome on 
this basis. Indeed, this element appears to be marginal for the current issue because, rather 
than deferring the decision to the national authorities through the tool of the margin of 
appreciation, the ECtHR seemed to have taken a quite clear stance on the matter of 
indigenous land rights. 
The impression from the reading of the two judgments is that the European Court 
was not familiar with indigenous rights and did not know how to properly deal with 
collective and communal property claims and, opting for a cautious solution, decided to 
apply its well established reasoning and understanding of private property rights. The 
ECtHR relied on the principle of ‘eminent domain’, i.e. on the presumption of state 
monopoly over land, also applied to the territories claimed by indigenous communities. 
On the basis that the indigenous community could not provide any legal title of ownership 
over the land, the state should be considered as the lawful owner of that land and could 
dispose it freely, granting or allocating it to third parties.55 
 
55 Cfr. Otis and Laurent 158, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human RIghts, Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 53rd Session, Indigenous 
The general different sensibility and attention towards indigenous rights between 
the regional bodies is easily explained by the history and politics of the countries 
involved. American and African countries have dealt with indigenous issues for a long 
time and, currently, these are still at the forefront of the political and social agenda of 
national and regional institutions. Indigenous communities in Africa and in the Americas 
have played a significant role in the history and politics of the two continents and they 
still play a fundamental role in the society. The African and the Inter-American human 
rights systems have amongst their priorities the protection of the indigenous 
communities56 and they actively contributed to the debate within the ILO and the UN 
bodies for the development of relevant international instruments. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that, in their judicial interpretation, the rights of the indigenous groups are 
applied and defended at the maximum level, setting a very high standard of protection.   
Consequences of judicial fragmentation 
The current situation of judicial fragmentation between, on the one hand, the European 
Court of Human Rights and, on the other hand, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights is likely to produce 
adverse effects.  
 First, the different judicial protection granted to indigenous communities living in 
Europe compared to those living in the Americas or in Africa poses a significant threat to 
the principle of universality. Indigenous rights are, as any other human rights, ‘universal, 
 
Peoples and their Relationship to Land- Final working paper prepared by thr Special 
Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21. 
56 A proof of this engagement is, for example, the establishment, by the Inter-American 
Commission, of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People 
(http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/mandate/Functions.asp) and, by the African 
Commission, of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in African 
(http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/indigenous-populations). 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’. 57As such, they should be interpreted and 
judicially applied by regional bodies in a way that ensure the maximum convergence, 
while respecting local peculiarities.  
 Second, the existing fragmentation between regional bodies, setting different 
standards of protection, could undermine the international protection of indigenous rights. 
The disagreement between regional bodies on the level of protection to be ensured could 
be easily used by states as an excuse for not complying with the demanding judgments or 
recommendations of the Inter-American and African bodies. 
 Third, the fact that the European Court did not refer to or acknowledged the well-
developed Inter-American jurisprudence on indigenous rights, the ILO Convention No. 
169 and the UNDRIP in its admissibility decisions is a strong signal of separation of the 
European system from the international framework. In addition, by ignoring the advanced 
and specific provisions contained in the ILO Convention No. 169 and in the UNDRIP, 
the ECtHR did in a way undermine their value and legitimacy as well as role in the 
international protection of indigenous rights. The ECtHR is a significant and authoritative 
body in human rights adjudication, often operating as a trend setter and is frequently 
imitated by other human rights bodies both at the international and domestic level. 
Continuing to do so will definitely aggravate the situation, making the two instruments 
impractical in practice when it comes to European indigenous communities. 
Lastly, a problem within the existing judicial fragmentation could be for the 
IACtHR and the ACommHPR to reach convergence by conforming its jurisprudence to 
the ECtHR, thus reverting to a lower standard of protection. Even though this possibility 
may be unlikely for the strong relevance that indigenous matters have in the Americas 
 
57 UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23, 12 
July 1993. 
and in Africa, the post-colonial influence that the European Court is exercising on the 
African human rights bodies may suggest the opposite.58 
Possible solutions for judicial fragmentation  
Considering the possible consequences of the current fragmented picture of regional case-
law on indigenous property rights, the natural solution would be for the ECtHR to adopt 
a more progressive approach and align itself to the IACtHR and the ACommHPR. 
As highlighted in the previous analysis, what the ECtHR missed is the recognition of the 
specificity of indigenous communities as subjects of law and bearer of particular rights. 
In particular, the protection of the right to collective property, especially when claimed 
by indigenous communities, has been the main challenge for the European Court.  
The International framework on the rights of indigenous people already offers a well-
developed protection, enough for allowing the ECtHR advancing its jurisprudence. 
However, the Strasbourg court, while sometimes acknowledging it, has always been quite 
reticent in accepting and adopting the standards contained therein. 
The two main documents on this regard are the ILO Convention No.169 and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.  
The ILO Convention No. 169 was approved in 1989 to update the existing norms 
protecting indigenous people contained in the ILO Convention No. 107.59 The latter was 
the first example of a binding international legal instrument completely dedicated to 
 
58 Unfortunately, the matter could not be discussed properly in this article. However, the alleged 
post-colonial heritage in the work of the African bodies can be observed, among others, in the 
Darfur case (Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE) v Sudan, Communications no. 279/03-296/05) where the African Commission 
refers to the ECtHR’s judgment Selçuk and Asker v Turkey (Application no. 23184/94-
23185/94, 24 April 1998) to conclude that an eviction amounts to a torture, contrary to its own 
jurisprudence in Ogoniland case (Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and 
Another v Nigeria, Communication no. 155/96, 2001). 
59 International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 
C107, 26 June 1957. 
indigenous rights. However, it lacked any substantial protection for indigenous people 
and was considered by indigenous communities as an ‘assimilationist’ instrument that, 
rather than ensuring their rights and independence, it was inducing them to gradually join 
and conform to the national society.60 In this context, the Convention No. 169 was the 
result of several efforts of civil society pushing for the approval of a document that was 
properly ensuring indigenous rights. The Convention reiterated in any possible way the 
fundamental principle that states should address any indigenous rights claim bearing in 
mind the specificity of indigenous people compared to any other minority. Moreover, it 
dedicated an entire section to land claims, recalling the importance of the protection of 
collective property and ancestral use of land.61  Unfortunately, the Convention has been 
ratified so far only by 22 countries, thus making the instrument of little practical use. 
Moreover, while from a European perspective the text could look as a progressive 
manifestation of indigenous rights, it has received significant critics from indigenous 
communities. It has been argued that the Convention was a confirmation of the 
Eurocentric vision of indigenous matters, hiding the ‘assimilation language’ already 
criticised in the previous Convention No. 107. The unclear meaning of the term ‘people’ 
used in the Convention, the absence of an explicit reference to the right to self-
determination, the lack of specific duties for the states to undertake proper consultation 
with the indigenous communities and the impossibility under the Convention to claim a 
property right on a land that is not currently occupied or used made indigenous people 
reject the ILO Convention.62 As Sharon Venne explicitly stated, the ILO Convention No. 
 
60 Gonzalo Aguilar Cavallo, Dinamica internacional de la cuestion indigena (Librotecnia, 2007). 
61 ILO Convention 169, Artt. 13-19. 
62 Sharon Venne, The New Language of Assimilation: A Brief Analysis of ILO Convention 169, 
Without Prejudice 53, no. 2 (1989), available at http://www. 
eaford.org/publications/3/WITHOUT%20Prejudice%20Vol_II_No2.pdf. 
169 should be considered as a legalized step backwards for indigenous rights and a further 
attempt to undermine indigenous people worldwide.63 
The UNDRIP, adopted in 2007 after many years of negotiation, represented a step 
forward in the advancement of indigenous rights. As pointed out by many commentators, 
the key principle when it comes to indigenous rights is the right to ‘self-determination’. 
Absent in the ILO Convention No. 169, the right to self-discrimination for indigenous 
people is explicitly stated in Article 3 where is provided that indigenous people have the 
right to ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development’.64  Moreover, the UNDRIP addressed and solved all the 
problematic points raised by the indigenous communities in relation to the ILO 
Convention No. 169. Besides recognizing the right to self-determination and the 
subsequent definition of ‘people’, it provides in Article 26 that ‘indigenous people have 
the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise used or acquired’.65 This stands in contrast with Articles 14 of the 
ILO Convention No. 169 that recognizes such right but only ‘over the lands which they 
traditionally occupy’,66 meaning that they currently occupy. Furthermore, the importance 
of the participation, rather than just the consultation, of indigenous people in any matter 
that can affect them is reiterated and underlined throughout all the declaration. That said, 
the UNDRIP remains an unenforceable instrument for its non-binding nature. 
In light of the above, it is possible to conclude that the UNDRIP is a significant 
advancement for indigenous property rights compared to the ILO Convention No. 169 
and contained specific provisions that could guide the ECtHR toward a more progressive 
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judicial application of Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR to indigenous people. To this extent, 
the transformation of the UNDRIP in a binding treaty could be a good step forward for a 
wider recognition of indigenous rights. This process should also occur with an active 
involvement of the regional systems, which should be invested of the ultimate role of 
enforcing the treaty at the regional level. Obviously, in order to be effective it will need 
a wide number of ratifications, definitely more than the 22 currently held by the ILO 
Convention. However, considering the different reception from indigenous community 
and specialized NGOs67 and the high number of ratification of the declaration so far, this 
new instrument could register a higher ratification rate.  
Lastly, a solution to fragmentation would be an increased cross-referencing 
between regional courts. If the European Court started looking at and referring to the 
case-law of the IACtHR on indigenous property rights, it would realize that the principles 
established by the Inter-American Court are easily transferrable and applicable to the 
European context as well. Considering that the letter of the property right provision in the 
ECHR and ACHR are mostly the same, the European Court should have no problems in 
adopting part of the Inter-American reasoning to adequately protect indigenous rights in 
Europe. However, this new route would entail a deep change of attitude of the ECtHR 
toward other regional jurisprudence and a different legal approach to its own 
jurisprudence. Still, the role of civil society and of NGOs specialised in indigenous rights 
is crucial in lobbying for this to happen and for making the European Court aware of the 
fact that, on certain matters, it should follow the example of other regional systems that 
have established considerably higher standards of protection.  
 
67 Cfr the reception of the UNDRIP by “First Peoples Worldwide”, the “International Work Group 
for Indigenous Affair”, “Cultural Survival” and “Native Planet”.  
Conclusion 
Judicial fragmentation is currently affecting the regional case-law on indigenous property 
rights. The different approach toward the issue, caused by legal, social and cultural 
variables determines divergent judicial outcomes of the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Commission of 
Human and People’s Rights. 
Considering the possible consequences that this phenomenon could determine, it is 
important to think and elaborate feasible solutions. Among them, the strengthening of the 
role of civil society and NGOs is certainly a key aspect. However it can produce results 
only if accompanied by an effort in changing the approach of the European Court to cross-
referencing and judicial borrowing from other regional systems. Lastly, the achievements 
of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People could be further increased by 
the transformation of the Declaration into a binding Treaty with an active participation of 
regional systems in the drafting and enforcement stages. 
 
 
